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This essay advances the idea that a dualism between faith and reason 
has come to characterize the postenlightenment theological enterprise.' 
This severance of faith and rationality is rooted in philosophical and not 
biblical modes of thought.2 The result of this dualism is the triumph of the 
irrational in the interpretation of religious symbols. It would appear that 
the rigid confinement of faith and reason to autonomous spheres of 
operation leads to the ascendance of nonhistorical, non~once~tual,  
nonpsychological, and nonrational interpretations of biblical concepts.) 
Historical Development of Dualism in Knowledge 
The interplay of rationality and irrationality in the realm of religion 
has been analyzed by the conservative Christian apologist Francis 
Schaeffer. In his Escape from Reason, Schaeffer traced the development of 
a dualism between faith and rationality beginning with Saint Thomas 
'The term postenlightenment is used to include both modern and postmodern 
theological developments. Schleiermacher, Bultmann, Barth, and Tillich are representative 
of the modern viewpoint; Lindbeck is representative of the postmodern camp. Gerhard 
Hasel, in a summary of the objections to historical criticism raised by E. Krentz, says, "Faith 
and the historical-critical method have ddfering means of determining reality. Thus, 
acceptance of historical criticism leads the Christian into intellectual dualism and forces him 
to live in two worlds that clash" (Biblicallntqretation Today [Washington, DC: Review and 
Herald, 1985],82); see also Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Faith and Reason," in Basic Questions in 
lleology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 47. 
'George Lindbeck holds that "in modern times, propositional understandings of 
religion have long been on the defensive and experiential-expressive ones in the ascendancy. 
. . . The origins of this tradition in one sense go back to Kant, for he helped clear the ground 
for its emergence by demolishing the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of the 
earlier regnant cognitive-propositional views" (George A. Lindbeck, TheNature ofDoctrine: 
Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age [Philadelphia: Westminster, 19841, 19-20). 
'A classic example of this is Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy: A n  Inquiry into the 
Nonrational Factor in the Idea of the Divine mad its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W.  
Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
Aquinas and ending with the twentieth-century existentialists.* Schaeffer 
conceptualized this dualism as advancing in a series of dichotomies: 
grace/nature, freedom/nature, and finally fai th/rat i~nali t~.~ He argued 
that grace, freedom, and faith referred to knowledge of the immaterial 
realm ("upper storey" knowledge), while nature and rationality referred to 
knowledge of the material realm ("lower storey" knowledge).' Schaeffer 
argued that this dualism gradually resulted in a radical discontinuity 
between "lower storey" and "upper storey" knowledge, and that ultimately 
reason became confined to the natural, physical, observable, empirical 
realm. The corresponding development was the relegation of religion to 
the "upper storey" realm of knowledge with the consequence that faith 
became thoroughly nonconceptual and nonrational.' Schaeffer perceived 
that the equation of faith with the nonrational represented a serious 
challenge to the doctrinal and conceptual elements of the biblical text. It 
is, no doubt, true that if faith is essentially nonrational, the cognitive 
element of religion is necessarily subordinate to the affective element. In 
this way experience becomes the criterion of truth without significant 
reference to the rational content of that experience. 
The epistemological dualism between faith and rationality appears to 
be related to the distinction in historical criticism between "Scripture" and 
"Word of God." This distinction was first articulated by Johann Semler 
in the 1770s and has been maintained through a powerful tradition, 
including such influential thinkers as Rudolph Bultmann and Karl Barth.' 
The Philosophical Basis of Dualism 
The philosophical foundation which prepared the way for the 
equation of faith with the nonrational mind was the transcendental 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In the Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphyscs Kant highlighted the main tenets of his philosophical system.9 
He explained that the primary purpose of the transcendental philosophy 
was "to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from 
'Francis Schaeffer, Escapefiom Reason (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1968). 
'1 am indebted to Professor John Baldwin of the Seventh-day Adventist Theological 
Seminary at Andrews University for this insightful analysis. 
h a n u e l  Kant, Prolegomena to Any  Future Metaphysics, trans. Paul Cams (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1996). 
general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents."1° Central 
to the thesis of this massive undertaking was Kant's insistence on "the 
subjective basis of all external phenomena."" He attributed this "subjective 
basis" of human reason to "sensibility itself."12 To this seminal idea Kant 
referred repeatedly throughout the Prolegomena, of which I will cite three 
particularly clear statements. 
It is indeed. . . incomprehensible how the visualizing of a present thing 
should make me know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot 
migrate into my faculty of representation." 
Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are 
given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing 
only their appearances, i.e., the representations which they cause in us by 
affecting our senses.14 
The object always remains unknown in itself; but when by the concept 
of the understanding the connexion [sic] of the representations of the 
object, which are given to our sensibility, is determined as universally 
valid, the object is determined by this relation, and it is the judgment 
that is objective." 
It is clear that for Kant "objective" knowledge is related exclusively to 
the "faculty of representation" or "judgment" and not to the "objects of 
our senses existing outside us." This idea represents both a "limitation" 
and an "extension" of the power of human reason. It is alimitation in that 
the critical faculty is confined to appearances but cannot penetrate into 
realities. It is an extension in that the mind is credited with the power of 
imposing its conceptual grid on all of reality. As Kant remarked, "The 
understanding does not derive its laws (aprion) from, but prescribes them 
to, nature."" Thus transcendental philosophy erected an impenetrable 
barrier between reason and the reality of "things in themselves." If it is 
true that the rational faculty imposes its own image on the external world, 
then it is limited as a means for comprehending anything outside the 
domain of its own operations. This means that anyone looking for 
anything other than 'subjective" knowledge would have to seek it apart 
from the rational capacity. 
"Ibid., 42. 
"Ibid., 34. 
The Psychological Basis of Dualism 
William James, in the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion, delivered at 
Edinburgh in 1901-1902, dealt at length with the relation of religion to the 
human mind. In a lecture titled "The Reality of the Unseen" he argued that the 
"subconscious and non-rational" mind is dominant "in the religious realm."" 
It would appear that this assertion was based in part on a dualistic notion of 
human nature. Said James: "If you have intuitions at all, they come from a 
deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism 
inhabits."18 In making that observation James was expressing an influential idea 
in the history of postenlightenment thought. If religion springs from a deep, 
nonrational region of the human mind, it follows that reason has in fact little 
to offer religion. If religion is primarily a function of the nonrational capacity 
of the mind, the articulate formulation of the grounds and content of belief is 
a peripheral and secondary matter. This is the conclusion reached by James in 
his lecture 18 he said that "feeling is the deeper source of religion, and in which 
philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products."19 In essence 
James argued that religion is a function of the affective, imaginative, 
nonrational capacity of the human mind and is not in any substantive way 
rooted in reason. In such a system of thought the interaction of faith and 
reason appears to be superficial. For James faith exceeds "verbal formulation," 
and reason fails to apprehend the "deeper level" of religious experience?' 
In his analysis, reason and faith are placed in the context of the 
antipathy between rationalism and mysticism." In his lecture on 
"Mysticism," James stated that "religious experience has its root and center 
in mystical states of consciousness."22 He explained that mystical 
consciousness "defies expression," in the sense that "no adequate report of 
its contents can be given in words," and mediates "insight into depths of 
truth unplumbed by the discursive intelle~t."~' The identification of religion 
with mysticism gives prominence to the nonverbal, nonintellectual, 
nonconceptual aspects of the religious experience. In th s  way the rational 
articulation of the faith is subordinated to the affective experience. As James 
"William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New 
York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1928), 74. 
put it, "Instinct leads, intelligence does but follow."" It would appear that 
the psychological foundation of the dualism between faith and rationality 
is rooted in an anthropological dualism. 
Friedrich Schleimachw: Cognition and Religion 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), a Prussian theologian, has been 
credited with setting the agenda of postenlightenment theological 
enquiry." One of the critical issues that Schleiermacher's writings raise is 
the relation of cognition and religion.26 In his first influential work O n  
Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, he attacked rationalism and 
dogmatism by advancing the notion that "ideas and principles are all 
foreign to religion."" The sentiment thus expressed was not merely a 
rhetorical device reflecting the Pietist influences of his upbringing but 
central to the main argument of the Speeches. That argument was 
articulated by Schleiermacher in the First Speech: 
I maintain that in all better souls piety springs necessarily by itself; that 
a province of its own in the mind belongs to it, in which it has unlimited 
sway; that it is worthy to animate most profoundly the noblest and best 
and to be fully accepted and known by them.28 
The "province of its own in the mind" from which piety "springs" is, 
according to Schleiermacher, an immediate understanding, "immediate 
feeling," and "immediate consciousness" of the "Infinite and Eternal" 
presence that pervades all of life.29 It seems that this "immediate 
consciousness" of the "infinite" transcends rationality, for it refuses to 
recognize the antitheses that "morality," "philosophy," and systematic 
theology acknowledge. He states: 
Only when the free impulse of seeing, and of living is directed towards 
the Infinite and goes into the Infinite, is the mind set in unbounded 
liberty. . . . In this respect, it is all worthy of preservation and 
contemplation, however much, in other respects, and in itself, it is to be 
rejected. To a pious mind religion makes everything holy, even 
unholiness and commonness, whether it is embraced in his system of 
"Keith Clements, Friedrich Schleiermacher: Pioneer ofModern Theology, The Making of 
Modern Theology (h4inneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 7. 
26Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. John 
Oman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 43-49. 
27Schleiermacher, On Religion, 46. 
28Schleiermacher, On Religion, 2 1. 
thought, or lies outside, whether it agrees with his peculiar mode of 
acting or disagrees. Religion is the natural and sworn foe of all 
narrowmindedness, and of all onesidene~s.~~ 
For Schleiermacher there could be no equation of a sacred text and the 
dynamic, essential element in religion: 
Not every person has religion who believes in a sacred writing, but only 
the man who has a lively and immediate understanding of it, and who, 
therefore, so far as he himself is concerned, could most easily do without 
ite3' 
In hisview, texts are merely "propositions which arose purely out of reflection 
upon the religious emotions."32 It would seem that for Schleiermacher the 
rational forrn&xion of the faith represented so much wasted ink, for "all forms 
are too rigid, all speech-malung too cold and tedious."33 
Schleiermacher's contribution to hermeneutics should not be 
overlooked. He viewed the hermeneutical task as both a philosophical 
enterprise and a form of art." "Understanding a speech," according to 
Schleierrnacher, "always involves two moments: to understand what is said 
in the context of the language with its possibilities, and to  understand it as 
a fact in the thinking of the speaker."" Corresponding to these two 
"moments" is the interpreter's "linguistic competence" and "ability for 
knowing people."36 Schleiermacher's comment on the latter skill is 
particularly illuminating. "One's ability to know people refers especially 
to a knowledge of the subjective element determining the composition of 
th~u~hts."'~Because of this "subjective element" between the thought and 
the written word, it followed that the interpreter ultimately had "no direct 
knowledge of what was in the author's mind."3Wowever, this was of no 
real concern for Schleiermacher because all religious documents are only 
"the handiwork of the calculating understanding. . . not the character of 
I0Ibid., On Religion, 56. 
"Ibid., On Religion, 9 1. 
"Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1948), 82. 
"Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christmas Eve: Dialogue on the Incarnation, trans. Terrence 
Tice (Richmond, VA; John Knox, 1967), 85. 
"Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, American 
Academy of Religion Texts and Translations (Missoula: Scholars, 1977), 95-96. 
religion."39 The severance of faith and rationality in Schleiermacher is most 
evident in his insistence on the primacy of 'immediate feeling." 
Rudolph Bultmann: Dem ythologized Faith 
Rudolph Bultmann (1884-1976) is best known for his demythologizing of 
the NT. This method of biblical interpretation aimed to "recover the deeper 
meaning behind" such "mythological conceptions" as the virgin birth, 
preexistence, divinity, and second coming of Jesus Christ, as well as other 
biblical ideas rejected by modern science.40 For Bultmann the modern 
scientific conception of the world as a closed "nexus" of "cause and effect" is 
as axiomatic."" This "scientific" presupposition admits of no 
visible, historical, or objective activity of God in the world. Bultmann 
affirmed: "The whole of nature and history is profane. It is only in the light of 
the proclaimed word that what has happened or is happening here or there 
assumes the character of God's action for the believer."42 For Bultmann 
objective events in the real world only assume the "character of God's actionn 
by faith in the 'proclaimed word." Thus "faith" is not directed toward the 
objective events but toward interpreted events. 
For what we call facts of redemption are themselves objects of faith and are 
apprehended as such only by the eye of faith. They cannot be perceived apart 
from faith, as if faith could be based on data in the same way as the n a d  
sciences are based on data which are open to empirical ob~ervation.~~ 
It is instructive to look at Bultmann's demythologization of NT 
Christology as an example of how "faith" and "empirical observation" are 
distinguished. 
It is precisely the mythological description of Jesus Christ in the New 
Testament which makes it clear that the figure and the work of Jesus Chrii 
must be understood in a manner which is beyond the categories by which 
the objective historian understands world-history, if the figure and the work 
of Jesus Christ are to be understood as the divine work of redemption.* 
For Bultmann the "categories by which the objective historian understands 
world-history" are incompatible with the biblical (mythological) 
39Schleiermacher, On Religion, 15. 
40Rudolph Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mytholoay (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1958), 14-18. 
41Rudolph Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, ed. Robert W. Funk, trans. Louise 
Pettibone Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 1:247-248. 
42Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 85. 
431bid., 72. 
description of the divine person and work of Jesus Christ. Because of this, 
"Jesus Christ must be understood in a manner which is beyond" these 
"categories." But rather than accept "the mythological description of Jesus 
Christ in the New Testament" as trustworthy, Bultmann insisted on 
reinterpreting the divine person and work of Christ along secular 
historical lines. He fully recognized the paradoxical nature of this 
endeavor. "This is the paradox of faith, that faith 'nevertheless' 
understands as God's action here and now an event which is completely 
intelligible in the natural or historical connection of events."45 
It is astonishing that Bultmann could identify "an event which is 
completely intelligible in the natural or historical connection of events" 
with "God's action." But it is crucial to note that this identification was 
not a rational observation but the "nevertheless" of faith. For Bultmann, 
faith was a decision to believe in the divine activity in the world in spite 
of rational knowledge to the contrary." He noted: "For it is beyond the 
sphere of historical observation to say that this Word and its proclamation 
are God's act."47 For Bultmann the dualism between faith and reason was 
crucial to his program of demythologization. 
Karl Barth: "Faith Alone" Epistemology 
Karl Barth (1886-1968) exerted tremendous influence on twentieth- 
century theological thought through his "dialectical" theology. Dialectical 
theology is essentially a rejection of natural revelation in theological 
epistemology, i.e., the refusal to acknowledge any human source of the 
knowledge of God.'* Barth crystallized this rejection in his sharp response 
to an open letter by Emil Brunner titled "Nature and Grace," which 
argued for a legitimate natural theology. "Real rejection of natural 
theology does not form part of the creed. Nor does it wish to be an exposi- 
tion of the creed and of revelation. It is merely an hermeneutical rule, 
forced upon the exegete by the creed . . . and by revelation."" 
According to Barth, the problem with natural revelation is that it 
added to "the knowability of God in Jesus Christ," the "also" of "his 
'"Faith in God, indeed, is never a possession, but rather always a decision." Rudolph 
Bultmann, 'The Crisis of Faith," in Rudolph Bultmnn: Interpreting Faithfor the Modem Era, 
ed. Roger Johnson (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 251. 
'Clifford Green, Karl Barth: Theologian ofFreedom (Minneapolis: Fortress, 199 I), 15 1. 
'%arlBarth, 'No! Answer to Ernil Brunner," in Natural Theology (London: Centenary, 
1946), 76. 
knowability in nature, reason, and history." As he pointed out in his 
criticism of the "German nature and history myth" underlying the Nazi 
ideology, the "also" is in reality an "only."50 For ~ a r t h  t e "also" of natural 
revelation rivaled the exclusivity of sola Smptura, sola fide, and solus 
Christus. "An idea, constructed with the claim to be an idea of God, is as 
such, not as an idea but simply because of this claim, an idol from the 
standpoint of the exclusiveness expressed in the biblical te~timonies."~~ 
The concept that "an idea of God" is "an idol" is avirulent expression 
of Barth's understanding of "rationality" as the antithesis of "revelation." 
In his explosive commentary on Romans he laid the foundation for his 
massive assault on reason. Barth acknowledged that his exposition of 
Romans was essentially a systematic recognition of the "infinite qualitative 
distinction" (a phrase borrowed from Kierkegaard) between the human 
and the divine.12 Notice in particular the concept of "truth" that emerged 
from the crucible of this dialectic: 
The truth, in fact, can never be self-evident, because it is a matter neither 
of historical nor of psychological experience, and because it is neither a 
cosmic happening within the natural order, nor even the most supreme 
event of our imaginings. Therefore it is not accessible to our perception: 
it can neither be dug out of what is unconsciously within us, nor 
apprehended by devout contemplation, nor made known by the 
manipulation of occult psychic powers.53 
The assertion that "truth" is not "historical" or "psychological," and 
ultimately "not accessible to our perception," is stunning. And yet this 
insight lies at the heart of Barth's theology, which is consistently framed 
using the language of paradox. In defining truth as nonhistorical and 
nonpsychological he struck a blow against liberalism's insistence on the 
"knowability of God in nature, reason, and history" and defended the 
unpopular notion of supernatural divine revelation. However, the 
argument itself revealed Barth's acceptance of the dualism between faith 
and rationality that has permeated the thought of postenlightenment 
culture. If "truth" is neither "historical" nor "psychological," it would 
follow that it is not rationally accessible or even communicable. How is 
truth then to be received? Barth provided an answer in a statement dealing 
with NT Christology: "Jesus is presented to us unmistakably as the Christ, 
%Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/I, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edmburgh: T & T Clark, 
1957), 173, 174. 
"Barth, Church Dogmatics I/I, 449. 
52Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), 99; Green, Karl Bad, 17. 
53Barth, Romans, 98. 
but his Messiahship is also presented to us as a sharply defined paradox. It 
is a matter for faith only."54 
The concept of sola f i e  expressed here is extremely important for Barth. 
He understood "faith alone" as the ultimate ground of any authentic 
knowledge of God. Barth's work Anselm: Fzdes Qumens Intellectum is a 
careful analysis of Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God and a statement of 
the importance of sola fide for theological epistemology. Anselm's approach to 
the question of God's existence is cited approvingly by Barth: "Grant me to 
understand-as much as Thou seest fit-that Thou dost exist as we believe 
Thee to exist, and that Thou art what we believe Thee to be."55 
Notice that for both Anselm and Barth, faith ("we believe Thee to 
exist") precedes understanding ("grant me to understand"). Barth argued 
persuasively that Anselm's proof was in fact a rational, intellectual 
articulation of the "thought of the existence and nature of God," which 
was first accepted as "credible on other gro~nds."~' The "other grounds," 
on which the existence of God is accepted, is faith alone. For Barth "faith 
alone" meant an acceptance of the "givens" of divine revelation with no 
psychological, historical, or rational assurances. 
Faith is the faithfulness of God, ever secreted in and beyond all human 
ideas and affirmations about him, and beyond every positive religious 
achievement. There is no such thing as mature and assured possession of 
faith: regarded psychologically, it is always a leap into the darkness of 
the unknown, a flight into empty air, . . . a leap into the void.57 
For Barth the severance of faith and rationality was the epistemological 
equivalent of the doctrine of justification by faith alone. 
Paul Tillich: "Ultimate Concern JJ without Content 
Paul Tillich (1886-1965) sustained a lifelong theological interest in the 
relationship between religion and culture. One of the primary objectives 
of his writings was the articulation of a theology of culture, a 
"theonomy,"58 which he explained in the following terms: "A theonomous 
culture expresses in its creations an ultimate concern and a transcending 
%arl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quarens Intellectum (London: SCM, 1960), 13. 
57Barth, Romans, 98-99. 
58Paul Tillich, 7'he Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adam (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1948), 55-65. 
meaning not as something strange but as its own spiritual ground."59 
Tillich referred to his cultural theology as "a fresh interpretation of the 
mutual immanence of religion and culture within each other."60 His 
concept of "transcending meaning" as the "spiritual ground" of culture is 
crucial. For Tillich "transcendence" was not something outside of human 
reality but entirely within the realm of time, history, and culture. Because 
"transcendence" is the "spiritual groundn of all finite reality, the concept 
of supernatural or special revelation was rejected by Tillich. "If it is the 
nature of fundamental religious experience to negate the entire cognitive 
sphere and affirm it through negation, then there is no longer any   lace for 
a special religious cognition, a special religious object, or special methods 
of religious epistemology."61 Having discarded the concept of special 
revelation, Tillich redefined revelation within the context of his 
theonomy. "Revelation is the manifestation of the ultimate ground and 
meaning of human existence. It is not a matter of objective knowledge, of 
empirical research or rational inference."" 
It is significant that the rejection of "special" revelation, the negation 
of the "entire cognitive sphere," and the divorce of revelation from 
empirical, rational, objective knowledge go hand in hand. This would 
seem to indicate that for Tillich, reason is inadequate as a means of 
apprehending the "ultimate concern" of religion. He stated directly that 
rationality does not "give the content" of theology and that "every 
debate that remains only in the rational plane does not penetrate to the 
essence" of reality." For Tillich reason is exclusively related to only one 
level of knowledge. "There is a level in life, the most and ultimately the 
only important one, which cannot be approached directly. It is the level 
of gnosis or sapientia or 'wisdom,' in distinction from the level of 
episteme or  scientia or '~cience. '"~ He approvingly cited examples of 
those who, like him, were engaged in the search for this gnostic 
knowledge at the deepest level of reality. 
61Paul Tillich, "On the Idea of a Theology of Culture," in Paul Tillich: 7IJeologian of 
the Boundaries, ed. Mark Kline Taylor (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 41. 
62Paul Tillich, "The Problem of Theological Method," in Four Existentialist 73eolo- 
gians, ed. Will Herberg (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1958), 275. 
'j31bid., 276; Paul Tillich, "Basic Principles of Religious Socialism," in Political 
Expectation, ed. James Luther Adam (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 61. 
64Tillich, The Protestant Era, 65. 
Theories of intuitive knowledge, classicist and romantic revivals of ancient 
or medieval forms of thought, phenomenology, the philosophy of life 
(aesthetic or vitalistic), the "theory of Gestalt," some types of the psychology 
of the "unconsciousn-all these seek for the inner power of things beyond (or 
below) the level at which they are calculable and do~ninable.~~ 
Ultimately, for Tillich the incalculable essence of all life was a revelation 
of the "infinite depth and the eternal significance of the present."u However, 
such an insight was "possible only in terms of a paradox, by faith, for, in itself, 
the present is neither infinite nor eternal."67 Faith is an "immediate awarenessn 
of the unconditional ground of being" However, such faith is "empty," 
"undirected," "absolute," "undefinable," and impervious to doubt because it has 
"no special content" that can be scientifically or philosophically challenged." 
For Tillich the ultimate concern of religion was not a matter of cognitive 
knowledge but of incomprehensible theonomous reality. 
George Lindbeck: Rationally Vacuous Faith 
The classic expression of postmodern or postliberal theology is George 
Lindbeck's The Nature ofDoctrine." In it he compares preliberal cognitive- 
propositionalism, liberal experiential-expressivism, and postliberal cultural- 
linguistic theories of d~ctrine.~' Cognitivism holds that "church doctrines 
function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective 
realities."" This approach to religious truth was historically dominant 
until experiential-expressivism became the regnant viewpoint after Kant." 
Expressivism represents a shift toward subjective experience. 
Thinkers of this tradition all locate ultimately significant contact with 
whatever is f d y  important to religion in the prereflective experiential 
depths of the self and regard the public or outer features of religion as 
68Tillich, "The Problem of Theological Method," 276. 
'qbid.; Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 176. 
"George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in  a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: Westrninster, 1984). See also idem, The Nature of Confession: Evangelicals and 
Postliberals in  Conversation, ed. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholrn (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1996). 
expressive and evocative objectifications (i.e., nondiscursive symbols) of 
internal e~~erience.7~ 
Lindbeck finds both cognitive and expressive approaches to religion 
unsatisfactory. Apparently through ecumenical dialogue he felt "compelled by 
the evidence . . . to conclude that [doctrinal] positions that were once really 
opposed are now really re~oncilable."~~ This situation led to the search for a 
new paradigm in which to understand religious truth. 
Postliberal cultural-linguistic theories of religion draw from 
"anthropological, sociological, and philosophical literature" to highlight 
those "respects in which religions resemble languages . . . and are thus 
similar to cultures."" The result of this culturalism is that the conceptual 
element of religion is subordinated to other elements. 
Thus while a religion's truth claims are often of the utmost importance to it (as 
in the case of Chr i i t y ) ,  it is, nevertheless, the conceptual vocabulary and the 
syntax or inner logic which determine the hinds of truth claims the rehgon can 
make. The cognitive aspect, while often important, is not primary.n 
The propositional truths of religion are not primary, because "its inner 
structure" is "far richer and more subtle than can be explicitly 
articulated."" This "inner structure" is composed of "first-intentional" or  
subconscious 'cognitive acti~ities."~~ Official church doctrines represent 
"second-order discourse" on "first-intentional uses of religious language."80 
Lindbeck acknowledges that postliberalism leads to an "informational 
vacuity" in significant church doctrines." For example, notice how he 
deals with the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus: 
The signifcaturn of the claim that Jesus truly and objectively was raised from 
the dead provides the warrant for behaving in the ways recommended by the 
resurrection stories even when one grants the impossibility of specdying the 
mode in which those stories ~igxufy.8~ 
For culturalism 'objective" truth is not related to the "significatum" (the 
proposition) but to the "significator" (the language in which the 
proposition was articulated). Doctrines make "intrasystematic rather than 
ontological truth  claim^."^' The example that Lindbeck uses to illustrate 
"intrasystematic" truth is significant. "Similarly, to cite yet another parallel, 
the statement "Denmark is the land where Hamlet livedn is intrasystematically 
true w i t h  the context of Shakespeare's play, but this implies nothing regarding 
ontological truth or falsity unless the play is taken as h~story."~ 
For cult~alkm the truth of Scripture is "immanent" as a "semiotic universe 
paradigmatically encoded in holy writ."" This "categorial truth"" is rationally 
and informationally vacuous and thus is not subject to any external criteria of 
evaluation. Even Lindbeck recognizes the irrational tendencies of culturalism. 
If there are no universal or foundational suuctures and standards of judgment 
by which one can decide between different rehgous and nonreligious options, 
the choice of any one of them becomes, it would seem, purely irrational, a 
matter of arbitrary whim or blind faith, and while this conclusion may fit much 
of the modem mood, it is antithetical to what most religons, whether 
interpreted in liberal, preliberal, or postliberal fashion, have affirmed?' 
It seems clear that for cultural-linguistic theories of religion, faith and reason 
continue to be conceived in a dualistic sense. 
What are the implications of the idea that faith and reason function in two 
totally separated and mutually exclusive domains of the human consciousness? 
What are the rdcations of a dualistic anthropology which severs faith and 
reason? In particular, what is the sipficance of the concept that reason cannot 
plumb the depths of religion? Although comprehensive answers to these 
questions would require a more thorough treatment than can be given in this 
essay, at least one response can be advanced In the interpretation of sacred texts 
the epistemological d&m of reason and faith and the identification of religion 
exdusively with the nonrational domain of the human mind lead to the 
hermeneutical triumph of the irrational. It would seem that an identification of 
religion with the nonrational mind might result in the treatment of a religious 
text as a mere rational, verbal, superficial expression of a profoundly deep and 
inexpressible experience. This deeper meaning of the religious text is rationally 
impenetrable and infommunicable and can only be apprehended by the 
"Ibid., 80. 
nonrational, subconscious capabilities of the human mind. In this way the 
irrational mind comes to dominate and control the interpretive enterprise. This 
is, then, in reality the kind of thought that has come to dominate the 
postenlightenment theological enterprise. 
As has been seen in the philosophical, psychological, and theological 
documents examined in this essay, postenlightenment thought has tended 
toward the complete severance of faith and rationality. While rendering faith's 
claims impervious to the criticism of historical reason, this situation has also 
placed faith squarely in the realm of the nonrational. 
From this perspective it could be argued that the historicalmtical study of 
the Word of God has led to the formation of a faith that is nonhistorical, 
nonpsychological, and nonconceptual. It would appear that in the contemporary 
~eriod faith has become the equivalent of a stubborn insistence on the "truth" of 
that for which there is ultimately no rational foundation. It is not at all clear that 
this is a desirable development. 
A critique of the severance of faith and rationality must necessarily begin 
with an examination of the biblical materials relevant to this issue. Since it is 
beyond the smpe of this study to offer a comprehensive treatment of this topic, 
the discussion is limited to a brief examination of a few of the relevant biblical 
themes and passages. 
The first- chapter of Genesis lays the foundation of a biblical anthropology. 
"The Lord God formed the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into 
his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being (Gen 2:7, literal 
translation). 
In this perspective the human being is an indissoluble unity of material (dust 
of the ground) and immaterial (breath of life) components.88 The physical, 
mental and spiritual existence of the individual is woven into a single fabric of 
being (1 Thes 5:23)." In the totality of its existence, in every sphere of its being, 
the human creature in its original perfection was made in the "image of God" 
(Gen 1:27). This represents the seminal expression of biblical anthropology and 
"This is often referred to as Hebrew "totality thinking." See James Barr, 7he Garden 
of Eden and the Hope oflmmortality (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 36-38. The classic study 
on the psychosomatic unity of human nature in Scripture is Oscar Cullrnann, Immortality 
of the Soul or Resurrection of theDead? 7be Witness of the New Testament (London: Epworth, 
1958). For a modern treatment of this subject from an Adventist point of view, see Ginger 
Hanks-Harwood, "Wholeness," in Remnant and Republic: Adventist %mes for Personal and 
Social Ethics, ed. Charles W. Teel, Jr. (Lorna Linda, CA: Lorna Linda University, 1995), 127- 
144. 
'Wnless otherwise indicated, all Bible texts are taken from the New International 
Version (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978). 
is relevant to the severance of faith and rationality in at least two ways. First, it 
precludes any sharp dualism which would rigidly compartmentalize the various 
aspects of the human personality. The Genesis creation narrative does ths by its 
insistence that the human person (nephesh = living being) is a composite unity of 
body and spirit. These dimensions of human existence are indivisible as far as 
their functions and spheres of operation are concerned. From this perspective the 
characterization of faith and reason as mutually exclusive and independent in 
operation is an illegitimate citstinction. Second, as a creature in the "image of 
God" the human has, in every dunension of its being, a contact point with the 
transcendent Creator. Because of this, rationality is not in any sense to be 
considered as an inferior instrument in the quest for truth and understanding. 
The creation of human beings in the image of God does not entirely exhaust 
the biblical perspective on the relationship of faith and reason. Although human 
beings are made in the image of God, they are not of the same nature as God. 
The categories that best express the distinction between Creator and creature are 
infiite and f i t e .  The biblical witness is consistent in its insistence on the radical 
discontinuity of the human and the divine (1 Tim 1:lf). The obliteration of this 
crucial distinction is the essence of idolatry (Rom 1:2428). 
An important extension of the distinction between the infnite God and the 
f i t e  human being is the limitation of the powers of the human mind. Isaiah 
expressed this concept powerfully. "'For my thoughts are not your thoughts, 
neither are your ways my ways,' declares the Lord. 'As the heavens are higher 
than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than 
your thoughts'" (Isa 555:-9).% In this utterance the prophet employed the 
category of infinite space to convey the distinction between the mind of God and 
the mind of the human being. This insiience on the incomprehensibility of God 
might appear, on the surface, to bolster the rift between faith and reason that we 
have traced in this essay. If God is infinitely beyond all hurnan powers of 
comprehension, surely the dnceptual and rational character of theological 
knowledge must be secondary to relational, experiential, immediate knowledge. 
The function of biblical language which emphasizes God's incom- 
prehensible transcendence is not meant to relativize all rational epistemologies but 
to instill appropriate h u d t y  in the human mind. God's transcendence does not 
render conceptual, propositional knowledge meaningless but rather safeguards it 
from a presumption that borders on idolatrous arrogance. 
T o n  Rad views this text as one among other "references to the incomprehensibility 
of Jahwehn in the OT. Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament Theology: The Theology of Israel's 
Historical Traditions, trans. D.M.G. Stalker (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962)' 453. 
Brueggemann believes this text contains a "sapiential motif" which teaches that "God's 
capacity to hide things outdistances the capacity of the kings to find outn (Walter 
Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology.. Essays on Structure, Theme, and Text, ed. Patrick D. 
Miller [Minneapolis: Fortress, 19921,295). 
The insight that human thought is not divine is monotheism's answer to 
idolatrous polytheism. It is not a critique of the content of human thought but 
of its character. The comprehending powers of the human mind are not 
rendered insigrdicant because of their finite nature. However, a realization of the 
finiteness of the rational apparatus is a prerequisite for a stimulating mental 
encounter with the transcendent God 
Cultural Faith or Bibld Fuith$&Zness? 
Faith in the postenlightenment period, as was seen in the analysis of 
sign$cant thinkers, is often explained in terms of paradox. It appears to have the 
connotation of an acceptance of that for which there is ultimately no empirical, 
historical, psychological, scientific, or rational verification. In this epistemology 
faith begins where reason ends. This aspect of the severance of faith and 
rationality should also be critiqued in the light of the biblical witness. The Bible 
does draw a sharp distinction between those who see only with the empirical eye 
and those who see with the eye of faithsn In fact, the new birth or conversion is 
explicitly identified as the prerequisite for those who would "see" the kingdom 
of God (John 3:14). However, this distinction between natural and spiritual 
vision should not be interpreted ontologically. This would lead to an 
anthropological dualism that would strictly compartmentalize the spiritual 
insight and the ~ h ~ s i c a l  optical capacity. Although the two modes of seeing are 
not identical, they are not unrelated. And for this reason faith is not completely 
divorced from the physical, visible, material realm of event and activity. As Paul 
wrote, "'No eye has seen, no ear has heard, no mind has conceived what God has 
for those who love hunY-but God has revealed it to us by his Spirit. 
The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of Godn9* 
According to the apostle Paul, that which was previously invisible, 
inaudible, and inconceivable had in his preaching of the gospel now become 
visible, audible, and conceivable by a gracious action of God's Spirit. It is in the 
realm of horical, sensual knowledge that God discloses transcendent meaning. 
The knowledge of God is mediated through the five senses in exactly the same 
way as all other knowledge. "For since the creation of the world God's invisible 
q~alities-his eternal power and divine nature-have been dearly seen, being 
understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse" @om 
1:20). 
Faith, in its future orientation, is related to that which is not yet visible or 
audible but only potential in the form of promise (Heb 11: 1). However, this 
eschatological dimension of faith is presented in the context of a rehearsal of 
912 Cor 4:18; 5:7; Eph 1:18; Heb 1:l. 
'*l Cor 2:9, NIV. Cf. Job 12:22; Dan 2:22,28; Amos 4:13. 
the faith experiences of Israel's heroes, which in every instance are related to 
some specific historical event or activity (Heb ll:2ff). Thus we can reason that 
faith, even though oriented toward the future for its ultimate fulfillment, is 
grounded on the historically, psychologically, and rationally discernible events 
of the past history of the people of God. 
In this essay we have traced the sharp dualism of faith and reason in 
postenLghtenment theology. Thls dualism is rooted in philosophical and not 
biblical modes of thought. In every instance thxs dualism has led to a devaluation 
of the conceptual character of religious belief. The result is that a primary 
connotation of faith in the contemporary period is the acceptance of religious 
claims for which there is ultimately no convincing historical, conceptual, 
psychological, or rational evidence. 
On one level this phenomenon appears to be some sort of intellectual 
gnosticism intent on subverting an entire dimension of human existence, i.e., the 
rational life of the mind. On another level such faith has been secured from the 
attacks of scientific criticism because reason has been granted its own 
autonomous sphere of operation which excludes the realm of faith, and vice 
versa. In such an epistemology faith and reason are neither friend nor foe. 
Although such neutrality may serve a positive political and social function in a 
pluralistic world, it does not appear to aid in the serious quest for truth. The 
question that must be addressed is whether the price of a rationally vacuous faith 
is not too high. 
An intellectually satlsfylng and biblically sound alternative to the 
pornenlightenment severance of faith and reason must be sought. Religious beliefs 
should not be embraced irrationally, and reason should not be employed unfaith- 
fully. As persons made in the image of God and redeemed by the sacrifice of 
Christ, Christians should engage their affections and cognitions in the quest to 
understand and obey the psychologically, historically, conceptually, and ultimately 
rationally revealed will and Word of God 
